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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Brandon Dean Kinglsey appeals from his conviction for possession of
methamphetamine.

Specifically,

Kingsley

challenges

the

denial

of

his

suppression motion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The North Idaho Violent Crimes Task Force was assisting with a probation
search of Mr. Anderson. (10/11/11 Tr., p.3, Ls.7-25.) When law enforcement
arrived at Mr. Anderson's home, the saw Kingsley talking on a cell phone while
standing in the driveway. (10/11/11 Tr., p.4, Ls.7-9.) Because they were there to
search the home of a probationer who was a known drug dealer, there was a
concern that "Kingsley was a lookout in the front of the house on his phone."
(10/11/11 Tr., p.4, Ls.10-12.)
Detective Todd told Kingsley to get off the phone and asked Kinglsey to
come to the sidewalk to talk to him. (10/11/11 Tr., p.4, L.22 - p.5, L.4.) When
Kingsley walked over to where Detective Todd was standing, Detective Todd
asked Kingsley if he had any weapons. (10/11/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.8-11.) Kinglsey
informed the officer that "he had some glass [paraphernalia] on him" and told the
detective he could take it out of his front sweatshirt pocket. (10/11/11 Tr., p.5,
Ls.11-21.) The detective found and removed a clear glass pipe in a pouch from
Kingsley's pocket.

(10/11/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.22-25.)

Kinglsey then told Detective

Todd he had a "bindle" in his front left pocket.

(10/11/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.4-5.)
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Detective Todd removed the bindle from Kingsley's pocket and observed it to be
"a small zip lock style baggie with white crystals inside."

(10/11/11 Tr., p.6,

Ls.15-16.)
The state charged Kinglsey with possession of methamphetamine and
possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp.26-27.) Kinglsey filed a motion to suppress
and brief in support asserting Kingsley was searched "without probable cause
and without reasonable articulable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous
or engaged in illegal activity." (R., p.52.) Following a hearing on the motion
where testimony was given and the parties stipulated the preliminary hearing
transcript be entered into evidence for the court's determination (12/08/11 Tr.,
p.4, L.14 - p.5, L.7), the district court took the motion to suppress under
advisement, ultimately issuing a memorandum decision and order denying
defendant's motion to suppress (see R., pp.54-84).
Kingsley

entered

a conditional

plea

of guilty to

possession

of

methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress. (R., pp.87-90; 1/12/12 Tr., p.4, L.1 - p.17, L.17.) The court sentenced
Kingsley to two years fixed followed by two years indeterminate and retained
jurisdiction for up to one year. (R., pp.96-98; 3/13/12 Tr., p.41, Ls.6-24.)
Kinglsey timely appeals.
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ISSUE
Kingsley states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Kingsley's motion to
suppress?
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Kingsley failed to show that the district court erred in denying his
suppression motion?
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ARGUMENT
Kingsley Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His
Suppression Motion

A

Introduction
The district court denied Kingsley's motion to suppress, concluding

Kingsley had not been illegally detained or illegally frisked.

(R., pp.54-84.)

Kingsley argues on appeal that he was illegally detained by law enforcement at
the point "Detective Todd ordered him to get off his cell phone" without having
reasonable, articulable suspicion to support Kingsley's detention.
brief, p.4.)

(Appellant's

Kingsley has failed to show clear error because substantial evidence

supports the district court's finding, based on the totality of the circumstances,
that Kingsley was not detained. Additionally, the record supports a conclusion
that even if there was a detention, it was reasonable in light of the totality of the
circumstances.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers

to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 4856, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306, 309
(2004). Whether a consent to search was voluntary is a question of fact, the
determination of which is reviewed on appeal for clear error. State v. Reynolds,
146 Idaho 466, 472, 197 P.3d 327, 333 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Stewart, 145
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Idaho 641,648,181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008). At a suppression hearing,
the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh
evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.

State v.

Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v.
Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659,662 (Ct. App. 1999). "Findings will
not be deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence in
the record."

Stewart, 145 Idaho at 648, 181 P.3d at 1256 (quoting State v.

Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App. 2006)).

C.

Kingsley Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying
His Motion To Suppress
Kinglsey contends on appeal that the district court erred in determining

Detective Todd "[telling] Mr. Kingsley to get off the phone" was not a detention.
(Appellant's brief, p.6.)

Not all encounters between the police and citizens rises

to the level of a seizure:
Only when an officer, by means of physical force or show of
authority, restrains the liberty of a citizen may a court conclude that
a seizure has occurred. A seizure does not occur simply because a
police officer approaches an individual on the street or other public
place, by asking if the individual is willing to answer some questions
or by putting forth questions if the individual is willing to listen.
Unless and until there is a detention, there is no seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and no constitutional rights
have been infringed. Even when officers have no basis for
suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask the
individual questions and ask to examine identification. So long as
police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests
is required, the encounter is deemed consensual and no
reasonable suspicion is required.
State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 684, 263 P.3d 145, 149 (Ct. App. 2011)
(internal case citations omitted). The test to determine if a seizure has in fact
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taken place "is whether a reasonable person would have felt free to disregard the
police, decline the officer's request, or otherwise terminate the encounter." lg.
(citing State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843-44, 103 P.3d 454, 456-57 (2004)).
Examples of circumstances that may indicate a seizure occurred, even if the
person did not attempt to leave, include "the threatening presence of several
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the
person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Linenberger, 151 at
684, 263 P.3d at 149 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554
(1980)).
In the present case, Detective Todd "show[ed] [Kingsley] who [he] was"
and told him to get off the phone, come down and talk to [him]." (12/08/11 Tr.,
p.8, Ls.15-17.)

Detective Todd did not have his gun drawn.

(12/08/11 p.8,

Ls.10-13.) Detective Todd was on the sidewalk, about 20 feet away from where
Kinglsey stood on the driveway, when he asked Kingsley to come talk to him.
(10/11/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.2-7.) The district court noted the following:
Other facts weighing in favor of there not being a detention are:
Detective Todd was wearing plainclothes; it was daytime; there
were other officers present, but none were engaged in the
conversation between Detective Todd and Kingsley, they were
instead focused on Andersen; the lack of demands or orders by
Detective Todd; the cooperative nature of Kingsley in responding to
Detective Todd's requests; and the complete absence of any
physical restraint of Kingsley.
(R., p.82.)

When asked to come over to where Detective Todd was standing,
(10/11/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.8-11.) There is

Kingsley walked over to the sidewalk.
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nothing in the record to suggest Kingsley was compelled to walk over to the
officer, nor that Kinglsey could not have just turned and walked the other way.
The detective asked Kingsley if he had any weapons on him, to which Kingsley
replied he "had some glass on him." (10/11/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.11-12.)

Kingsley

consented to the officer taking it, telling Detective Todd that the item was in his
front sweatshirt pocket. (10/11/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.15-20.) Once the officer took the
"clear glass pipe," which he recognized as paraphernalia, from Kingsley's pocket,
Kingsley volunteered that he had a "bindle in his left front pocket." (10/11 /11 Tr.,
p.5, L.22 - p.6, L.5.)
From the point Kingsley told Detective Todd he had "glass" on his person,
the detective had probable cause to arrest Kingsley for the possession of
paraphernalia. A search incident to arrest is a well-settled exception to the
warrant requirement. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The purpose of
the search incident to arrest is to remove weapons from the arrestee's control,
discover items that if left in the arrestee's control might facilitate an escape effort,
and seize evidence of crime. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 228-29
(1973). It is well established that a search incident to arrest is proper even if the
search precedes a formal arrest, so long as probable cause to arrest a suspect
exists at the time of the search. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980);
State v. Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463, 468, 988 P.2d 689, 694 (1999); State v.
Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 351, 194 P.3d 550, 555 (Ct. App. 2008); State v.
Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 282, 108 P.3d 424,429 (Ct. App. 2005).
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Alternatively, notwithstanding Kingsley's assertion to the contrary, there
was reasonable articulable suspicion to support a detention of Kingsley.
Seizures of the person are evaluated under a Fourth Amendment standard of
reasonableness.

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697-700 (1981).

Generally, any seizure of a person, whether by arrest or detention, must be
supported by probable cause.

kl at 700;

Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,

208 (1979).

There are, however, certain exceptions to the probable cause

requirement.

For example, it is well-settled that a police officer may, in

compliance with the Fourth Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an
individual if that officer entertains a reasonable suspicion that a person has
committed, or is about to commit, a crime.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31

(1968); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,811,203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009) (citing
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)).
In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the Court must
consider the officer's training and experience and the reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from the facts available to the officer. See United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("[A] trained officer draws inferences and makes
deductions - inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained
person . . .. [T]he evidence ... must be seen and weighed not in terms of library
analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law
enforcement."); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct. App.
2004) ("An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her
possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience
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and law enforcement training.").

"Whether an officer possessed reasonable

suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the
officer at or before the time of the stop." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at
1210 (citations omitted).
Here, the evidence before the trial court was that the North Idaho Violent
Crimes Task Force was conducting a probation check on a "known drug dealer."
(10/11/11 Tr., p.3, L.20 - p.4, L.11.) Based on the training and experience of
narcotics Detective Todd, "at a drug seller's home on a drug seller's block or
parked in a car nearby there's often lookouts involved with narcotic activity."
(12/08/11 Tr., p.7, Ls.3-6.) Seeing Kingsley talking on the phone in the driveway
of a known drug dealer led Detective Todd to be concerned that Kingsley was in
fact operating as a lookout for the drug dealer inside the home. (See 10/11/11
Tr., p.4, Ls.10-11; 12/08/11 Tr., p.7, Ls.6-9.)

Contrary to the district court's

conclusion that the state presented no evidence that "Kingsley was engaged in a
joint enterprise with Andersen or had a suspicious demeanor, made suspicious
statements, or acted suspiciously" (R., p.65), it was not unreasonable for
Detective Todd to suspect, in light of the fact that the North Idaho Violent Crimes
Task Force was at the home to search the home known drug dealer who would
likely have reason to utilize a lookout based on his known status as a drug dealer
and Kingsley's presence on the property, that Kingsley was calling into the home
to advise the occupants to dispose of drug evidence because law enforcement
was approaching the home.
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Although the record is limited as to Kingsley's connection to Andersen's
residence, it is clear from his presence on Andersen's driveway making a phone
call that he had some connection to Andersen and Andersen's house. It is not a
normal course of events for people to walk onto the driveways of strangers to
stop and place a call. Here, Kingsley was standing on the driveway in front of the
garage where he could observe the four vehicles filled with law enforcement
personnel approach the house.
L.11.)

(10/11/11 Tr., p.4, Ls.1-12, p.9, L.20 - p.11,

It was then that Detective Todd made contact with Kingsley while the

remaining officers went to the garage and home. It is entirely possible Kingsley
chose that time to communicate to the people in the house that law enforcement
was on their way in before being told to get off of the phone by Detective Todd.
(10/11/11 Tr., p.4, Ls.20-23.) Immediately after making contact, Detective Todd
asked Kingsley if he had any weapons. (10/11/11 Tr., p.4, L.25 - p.5, L.1.)
Courts have regularly recognized the danger faced by officers when
confronting drug enterprises and have frequently validated measures to increase
officer safety in these situations even where other indicia that a suspect is armed
and dangerous are absent. An individual's proximity to or involvement with drug
transactions or distribution can support reasonable suspicion to frisk that
individual in circumstances where the use of such techniques normally would not
have been valid had the nature of the suspected criminal activity been
considered less prone to violence. See~. United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d
1185, 1194-95 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding a frisk was valid where the officer
"reasonably suspected that Johnson might be involved in drug dealing,
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kidnapping, or prostitution" which are crimes "typically associated with some sort
of weapon, often guns"); United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th
Cir. 2005) ("Because weapons and violence are frequently associated with drug
transactions, it is reasonable for an officer to believe that a person may be armed
and dangerous when the person is suspected of being involved in a drug
transaction."); United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080, 1086
(9th Cir. 2000) ("Because the police reasonably suspected [the defendant] of
dealing in narcotics, it was not unreasonable to believe that he might be
armed."); United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[W]hen [an]
officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in [a] vehicle, the officer
may, in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns, order the occupants
out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons" given that "the
indisputable nexus between drugs and guns presumptively creates a reasonable
suspicion of danger to the officer."); United States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171,
1177 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a frisk of vehicle occupants was reasonable
where an officer had observed large amounts of money on the front seat,
believed that it was drug money, and became concerned for his safety "because
persons involved with drugs often carry weapons"); State v. Bechtold, 783 P.2d
1008, 1010 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (the fact that officers "knew that people involved
in the manufacture and transportation of [methamphetamine] commonly carry
weapons" was part of justification for the frisk). This proposition is supported by
Terry itself where the Supreme Court recognized it was reasonable to assume
from the nature of the offense contemplated that Terry was armed and
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dangerous even though the officer had not observed a weapon or any physical
indication of a weapon. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28.
The Idaho Court of Appeals followed suit in State v. Dreier, 139 Idaho 246,
76 P.3d 990 (Ct. App. 2003). Having received consent to search the premises
from a home's occupants who were being held on suspicion of manufacturing
methamphetamine, an officer immediately frisked Dreier who emerged from the
house prior to the officers' entrance. Dreier, 139 Idaho at 248-49, 76 P.3d at
992-93.

The Court of Appeals determined that Dreier's exit from a site of

suspected illegal drug operations was significant in validating the pat down. 1

kl

139 Idaho at 250-51, 76 P.3d at 994-95. The court specifically emphasized that:
The officer's encounter with Dreier occurred at a home subject to
search for suspected drug manufacturing activity. The danger
posed to the safety of an officer conducting a search of premises
suspected of housing an illegal drug operation is increased by the
presence of a person found on the premises, who may be involved
in the criminal activities therein. See State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho
296, 299-300, 47 P.3d 1266, 1269-70 (Ct. App. 2002) (The threat of
violence to officers conducting a search of home suspected of
housing an illegal drug operation is greater because of the
recognized propensity of persons engaged in selling narcotics to
carry firearms.). See also United States v. Patterson, 885 F.2d
483, 485 (8th Cir. 1989) ("The possible danger presented by an
individual approaching and entering a structure housing a drug
operation is obvious. In fact, it would have been foolhardy for an
objectively reasonable officer not to conduct a security frisk under
the circumstances.").

kl at 250, 76 P.3d at 994.
The fact that an officer on the scene was aware that Dreier was a frequent
visitor to the home and that he was known to carry a weapon was also
considered by the court in its totality of the circumstances inquiry. Additionally,
the court noted "nothing in the initial stages of the encounter served to dispel the
officer's reasonable belief' that Dreier may have been armed and dangerous.
When asked whether he had any weapons, Dreier had motioned to his side and
indicated that he did. The officer then recovered a Leatherman tool from Dreier.
12

In State v. Crooks, 150 Idaho 117, 118-19, 244 P.3d 261, 262-63 (Ct. App.
2010), law enforcement officers conducted a probation search of a home while
waiting for a search warrant to be issued.

After securing the residence, law

enforcement performed pat-down searches of the individuals found in the home.

1Jt

150 Idaho at 119, 244 P.3d at 263. An officer felt a hard object in Crooks'

pocket and asked if it was anything he could use to harm the officers.

1Jt

Crooks

advised the officer it was a pipe and told the officer he could remove it from
Crooks' pocket.

~

The pipe contained methamphetamine residue and Crooks

was arrested and charged with possession of drug paraphernalia and possession
of a controlled substance.

1Jt

Crooks filed a motion to suppress, asserting the

pat down of him violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

1Jt

The Court of Appeal affirmed the district court's denial of Crooks' motion
to suppress, finding it reasonable to suspect those found in a home known to be
a source of drug dealing could potentially pose a risk to law enforcement:
In this case, Agent Sotka knew that drug transactions were
occurring in the apartment - specifically that K.K. had just
purchased drugs in the residence, and he had reason to believe
Crooks was the supplier of at least some of the drugs sold there .
. . . Crooks was present in a private residence associated with illegal
drug activity, and several other persons were known to be
associated with drug activity were also present.
Given our recognition of the reasonableness of the belief
that drug crimes are often accompanies by weapon use, and that
the need to promptly neutralize this risk is crucial to officer safety,
we conclude that the presence of organized or ongoing drug
dealing is a factor to be considered when determining whether a
frisk was lawful.
150 Idaho at 122, 244 P.3d at 266.
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With Detective Todd's knowledge that the task force was present to
search Andersen's home for evidence of drug dealing, his experience with
lookouts located near drug dealers' home, Kingsley's presence on a Andersen's
driveway, while making a call, possibly calling into to alert the people inside the
house, and the increased likelihood that people involved in the drug trade often
use weapons, the totality of the circumstances before Detective Todd were
sufficient to form reasonable suspicion that Kingsley was acting as a lookout for
Andersen or had some other association and his drug dealing and was a
potential threat to Detective Todd, thus justifying the officer's directive to Kingsley
to hang up his phone and to ask him whether or not he had any weapons.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
denying Kinglsey's motion to suppress.
Dated this 29 th day of April 20~ 3.
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